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ABSTRACT
Utilizing a large-N data that covers about 20000 observations from about 200 countries from 1789
to 2018 from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, and anchored on institutionalism as an
overarching theory, and the nascent literature on civil-society corruption nexus, the paper looks at
the predictive capacity of civil society environment, transparency of laws and predictability of
enforcement, and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration in political corruption.
Using a four-step hierarchical multiple regression, results show that while civil society and its
structure is a significant determinant of the level of political corruption, the introduction of
transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement, rigorousness, and impartiality of public
administration, and civil society environment in the regression model accounted for additional
variance in political corruption. Practical and theoretical implications, particularly on civil society-
corruption nexus and the broader corruption-democracy linkage, are discussed.
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Introduction
That corruption, defined by the World Bank and the
extant academic literature (see Amundsen, 1999; Chang
& Chu, 2006; Desta, 2006; Gerring & Thacker, 2004;
Manzetti & Wilson, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 2008;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Sung, 2002;) as the abuse of
public office for private gain, is a pervasive and an
endemic problem around the world (United Nations
Convention Against Corruption) is non-debatable. For
Transparency International, no one country in the
world is corruption free, including those in the G20
and even those considered as long-lived democracies.
True enough, as Stevens (2016) argued, “the formal
institutions that are most likely to be involved in the
causes of corruption include the institutions of democ-
racy” (p. 185). Given its serious socio-economic and
political effects, leading development organizations
have emphasized the need to curb corruption (Gans-
Morse et al., 2018). While there is a unanimity that
corruption is detrimental to the interests of society in
general (Brown, 2007, Foreword), the search for the
ways to combat corruption has led to not only varied
but also unclear results of what works, or as Gans-
Morse et al. (2018) aptly put, “ … a clear sense of
which anti-corruption policies are likely to succeed”
(p. 172). This is expected given the multidimensional
and multilayered nature of corruption.
For the most part, the economistic perspective of
corruption (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999) has become
influential in the scholarly literature. However, as
critics note, this narrowly technical view has down-
played other important perspectives. As Hindess
(2013) posited, “to treat the problem of corruption as
if it were really amenable to technical solution is also to
ignore the fundamentally contentious character of poli-
tical life” (p. 10). It seems therefore that a broader
political perspective is needed to shed light into some
of the important questions both policy-makers and
scholars raise about what works to combat corruption,
apart from those offered by an economistic view. One
equally important body of work that looks at corrup-
tion from a contentious, political perspective is that
offered by the civil society literature. The extant litera-
ture on civil society-corruption nexus stresses on the
import of civil society organizations on corruption
mitigation. However, little research has been done
about the conditions under which civil society organi-
zations impact corruption despite calls from scholars in
the field to probe into these. Specifically, much less has
been done on the quality of public administration, that
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is the rigorousness and impartiality of public adminis-
tration, as a condition for civil society’s anticorruption
effects. The paper pursues this direction and hopes to
contribute to this field.
The article is organized as follows. A review of the
literature on civil society-corruption nexus followed by
the relationship between public administration, institu-
tions and civil society is presented. The hypotheses of
the article follow. The next section describes the data,
variables, and methods. Results are then presented. The
last section concludes and provides the limitations of
the study and prospects for future research.
Review of related literature
Civil society and corruption
The civil society-corruption nexus literature is cur-
rently divided between those who believe that civil
society’s impact in mitigating corruption is undeniable
(the optimists) (see for instance Grimes, 2013; Mungiu-
Pippidi & Dusu, 2011; Tusalem, 2007), and those who
claim that they have by themselves become corrupt or
conduits for corruption (the skeptics) (see Gibelman &
Gelman, 2004; Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating,
2007). Within the first group, development agencies
and scholars contend that civil society plays a key role
in fighting corruption. No less than the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) asserted that the civil society is important in
the global fight against corruption (OECD, 2003;
UNDP, 2008). This anticorruption function is mani-
fested in a number of respects. First, not only does civil
society provide information about or raise awareness
on corruption and report governmental malfeasance
(Grimes, 2013); it also serves as a vehicle for the mass
public to articulate their grievances and associate or
organize to call for and promote transparent and
accountable state institutions (Tusalem, 2007). Second,
civil society diagnostically assesses and monitors the
performance of public institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi &
Dusu, 2011). Civil society, in the words of Grimes
(2013), thus occupies an important role in a polity’s
meta-system of checks and balances. Third, civil society
partakes in anticorruption policy advocacy and rede-
sign of anticorruption institutions in states (Setiyono &
McLeod, 2010; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004).
Despite these optimistic views, there are those who
cast doubt on the decisive role of civil society in antic-
orruption efforts. The first group of scholars in this
strand point to challenges to the internal accountability
mechanisms of civil society organizations themselves.
That civil society organizations are often not very trans-
parent to the public or held accountable is a recurring
theme within this second strand (Ebrahim, 2003;
Townsend & Townsend, 2004). Gibelman and Gelman
(2004), for example, advanced that among many other
characteristics, the failure to institute internal controls,
lack of oversight and absence of checks and balances in
procedures and practices as well in nongovernmental
organizations breed corruption. Greenlee et al. (2007)
also added that nonprofit organizations suffer from
occupational fraud and thereby experience financial
losses due to their limited financial management capa-
city where “essential tasks are undertaken by indivi-
duals with little financial expertise and no training in
the design of appropriate controls against errors and
fraud” (p. 690) coupled by an atmosphere of trust that
discourages monitoring.
The second group of scholars within this strand
questions the autonomy of civil society organizations,
both from the state and from their donors. For exam-
ple, with reference to CSOs in the Middle East,
Wiktorowicz (2000) claimed that when CSOs are
embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal
codes which allows those in power to monitor and
regulate their collective activities, the civil society
becomes more an instrument of state social and poli-
tical control than a mechanism for empowerment.
Similarly, with reference to the case of Turkey, Doyle
(2018) posited that government co-option of civil
society transpires and thus CSOs function to dissemi-
nate government ideas in society and to provide a cloak
of democratic legitimacy to policy decisions. Indeed, as
Lewis (2010) provided, while non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) may act as organization spaces for
activism, they also present spaces into which govern-
mental power can be projected. The extent to which the
state or government does this is also evident in the
literature and it runs from the idea of transformation
of CSOs into “public utilities” and “semi-public agen-
cies” (van Biezen, 2004 in Saglie & Sivesind, 2018) and
“state agencies” (Dreher, Molders, & Nunnenkamp,
2007) to states’ colonization of voluntary organizations
(Lorentzen, 2004 in Saglie & Sivesind, 2018).
CSOs’ sources of funding, be it the state or external
donors, also have serious implications on their auton-
omy. For instance, it is claimed that NGOs in devel-
oping countries rely heavily on foreign donor funding
and donor dominance is evident (AbouAssi, 2012) to
the extent that NGOs re-align their priorities with
donor interests (Parks, 2008) and appropriate activ-
ities to funders’ priorities and demands (AbouAssi,
2014; Mosley, 2012). In this case, CSOs may thus
have limited possibilities of making ethically
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consistent decisions in view of their sources of fund-
ing (Egerer, Kankainen, & Hellman, 2018). Similarly,
the heavy reliance on external donor’s funding by
CSOs resulted in its disconnect from local publics
(Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2015) or as Ishkanian
(2014) noted, with particular reference to post-Soviet
societies, to its reduction to professionalized NGOs
that were engaged in advocacy which supported lib-
eral Western values, thereby losing its diversity and
authenticity – a stab on the very legitimacy of CSOs.
Indeed, as in recent years, studies about and calls for
NGO accountability are continuously mounting (see
for example, Ebrahim, 2003; Jepson, 2005; O’Dwyer &
Boomsma, 2015; O’Leary, 2017).
As an emerging body of literature, and which narrows
the supposed divide between the optimists and skeptics,
a possible third strand looks at the conditions under
which civil society may affect control of corruption,
including media, government transparency, political
competition, and important legal, political and socioeco-
nomic contexts partly shaped by national governments
(see Donaghy, 2011; Marinova, 2011; Uhlin, 2009, 2010;
Widojoko, 2017). What is common among the last group
of scholars above is the belief that civil society cannot
constitute a single, independent force in the anticorrup-
tion movement and reform. The current study is directed
towards an exploration of these conditions.
Linking public administration, civil society, and
corruption
The public administration and policy literature are of
course not silent on the issue. In particular for
instance, the literature on policy failure in corruption
control stresses on the problem of agency (see Fritzen,
2005; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010); insufficiency of existing
laws (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996); weakness of law
enforcement agencies (Batalla, 2015); and policy trans-
fer (Minogue, 2002). Similarly, in the policy imple-
mentation body, for instance target compliance,
among the factors why those whose behavior the
anticorruption policy seeks to change fail to act as
expected are: lenient penalties coupled by low detec-
tion and conviction rate; autonomy problems; and
information deficits (Batory, 2012). Brown (2007) suc-
cinctly puts that the success of anticorruption initia-
tives will depend partly on answers to three major
questions: (1) who owns the anticorruption efforts
being undertaken?; (2) is leadership being provided
from the highest levels of government?; and (3) does
the state have the capacity to implement anticorrup-
tion strategies and campaigns through effective detec-
tion, investigation, and prosecution? (Foreword, xi).
Interestingly, the scholarship on state-civil society
and bureaucracy/administration-civil society (policy)
partnerships bridges these two preceding bodies of
literature, and these raise important points in the
study of corruption and anticorruption policy, as well.
Initially, as Anechiarico (1998) noted, the scholarship
produced by the civil society literature and those of
public administration were separated due to increasing
professional and academic specialization compounded
by other factors. He cautioned that the civil society
scholarship neglects those aspects of public administra-
tion, which are important in the civil society literature’s
central element, civic engagement. Conversely, he con-
tinues, “the movement to “reinvent government” in
public administration, based on a model of the citizen-
consumer, neglects the importance of civic engagement
to its central element, government effectiveness” (p.
13). In the broader development literature, this sym-
biosis between civic engagement and government effec-
tiveness is heralded as well. Serageldin (1996) for
instance contends that strong, effective, and efficient
governments are essential to development because
they have the capacity to create an environment con-
ducive for the private sector and civil society to flourish
(as cited in Birner & Wittmer, 2006). Control of cor-
ruption, together with regulatory quality and effective
service delivery, is not only an aspect of the agenda of
good governance (Kaufmann, Kray, & Mastruzzi, 2003)
but also of the bigger agenda of development. Needless
to say, it is in these contexts that effective and capable
public administration is material.
Peters (2001) suggested that the interaction of
administration with both formal and informal political
actors in the society has a profound impact on the
behavior of administrators and on their decisions. The
import of this relationship between bureaucracy and
civil society in policy is highlighted in the extant litera-
ture. For instance, Rashid (2014) posited that the qual-
ity of policy inputs of a bureaucracy is affected by three
important factors: (1) political influence in bureaucratic
functions; (2) decline of bureaucratic capacity as to
policy support and management; and (3) weak engage-
ment of bureaucracy with civil society and nongovern-
mental organizations. As to administration, the
literature on collaborative governance and participatory
governance also emphasizes this relationship. For
instance, looking at the case of Guatemala’s forest
administration, Birner and Wittmer (2006) advanced
that the success of Instituto Nacional de Bosque
(INAB) was based on its institutional design anchored
on the two principles of delegation and partnership.
That delegation of authority to an autonomous body
characterized by partnership with the private sector and
554 P. A. G. VILLANUEVA
civil society proved successful even more so in a sector
where mismanagement and corruption were wide-
spread. Several other landmark cases where the part-
nership proved challenging but successful were the
Philippines’ Department of Education’s (DepEd)
Textbook Count that sought to address concerns on
the transparency, accountability, and efficiency of the
DepEd through the help of the civil society organiza-
tion Government Watch (G-Watch) (Leung, 2005); and
Brazil’s Porto Alegre case where participatory budget-
ing has reduced opportunities for favoritism and chal-
lenged the infrastructure of clientelism (Abers, 1998).
However, some scholars point to the downsides of
participatory policy-making and deliberation. For
instance, calling it “participatory-deliberative public
administration” (PDPA) whose main goal is the pro-
motion of a rejuvenation of democratic institutions and
progressive politics by favoring direct civil society
involvement in public policy-making, Baccaro and
Papadakis (2009) claim that policy developments in
South Africa point to yet one important defining ele-
ment of the relationship mentioned in the preceding
discussion which deviates from the central elements of
participatory governance: “the state does not just ben-
evolently devolve, as PDPA theory assumes, but rather
has clear preferences about the kind of policies it wants
participatory fora to adopt, generally as a result of
international macroeconomic pressures” (p. 247). The
question of whether the state has predetermined
options for civil society in the deliberation process
thus surmounts. More importantly though, noting the
success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre as
compared to those in South Africa, Baccaro and
Papadakis (2009) contend that “participatory institu-
tions may work in particular circumstances, but also
that, in the absence of those circumstances, they may
fail dramatically” (p.270).
It follows from the preceding discussion that the
environment within which civil society operates, not
only its structure or other internal characteristics, con-
dition its influence on corruption. The broader institu-
tionalist framework is informative in this regard. The
significance of institutions in addressing the corruption
problem is widely highlighted in the extant literature.
Open and transparent political institutions (Alt &
Lassen, 2003; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010), strong rule
of law and well-established political-legal structures
(Zhan, 2012) including the justice system institutions
(Rios-Figueroa, 2012), electoral rules and constitutional
framework (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005), the
design and structure of government institutions and
political processes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) and antic-
orruption commitment rules (Collier, 2002) and
agencies and enforcement organizations (Yang, 2009)
inhibit corruption.
Hypotheses
From the above discussion then, and following the
third strand in the civil society-corruption nexus litera-
ture, I argue that while civil society and its structure
affects corruption mitigation, such effect is conditioned
by a number of factors. Firstly, the environment that
regulates specifically the entry and exit of CSOs and the
extent to which the government attempts to repress
CSOs is important in the CSO’s anticorruption effects
(H1). Secondly, anchored on institutionalism as an
overarching theory, I also argue that the broader poli-
tico-legal institutional environment is as well signifi-
cant. I hypothesize, therefore, that the presence or
absence of transparent laws with predictable enforce-
ment is material in accounting for civil society’s sup-
posed effect in curbing corruption (H2). Lastly,
gleaning from public administration and the bureau-
cracy-civil society relationship body, I hypothesize that
rigorous and impartial public administration condi-
tions not only the effect of civil society structure but
also the effects of civil society environment and trans-
parent laws and predictable enforcement in political
corruption (H3).
Data, variables, and methods
This paper relies on the data from Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem),1 which covers about 200 coun-
tries with a time-series from as early as 1789 to present.
The data used here are measured in an ordinal scale
and calculated into interval scale by the measurement
model of the V-Dem, except for political corruption,
which was already in interval scale.2
Independent variables
The key independent variables are civil society struc-
ture, civil society environment, transparency of laws
and predictability of enforcement, and rigorousness
and impartiality of public administration.
Civil society structure
This variable measures the strength of CSOs. It is
argued that the strength of CSOs is significant in its
anticorruption effects but it is conditioned by three
factors: civil society environment, transparency of
laws, and rigorousness of public administration. Two
(2) variables from the V-Dem are used to indicate civil
society structure: CSO participatory environment
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(v2csprtcpt), which describes the involvement of people
in civil society organization; and CSO consultation
(v2cscnsult), which describes whether major civil
society organizations are routinely consulted by policy-
makers on policies relevant to their members. Similar
to the succeeding variables, the preceding indicators
flow from less democratic to more democratic, unlike
in the dependent variable, political corruption index,
which flows from less corrupt to more corrupt.
Civil society environment
This is divided into two (2) main variables from the
V-Dem, which are CSO repression (v2csreprss), which
looks at whether the government attempts to repress
civil society organizations; and CSO entry and exit
(v2cseeorgs), which assesses the extent to which the
government achieves control over entry and exit by
civil society organizations in to public life (see
Bernhard, Tzelgov, Jung, Coppedge & Lindberg, 2015;
Coppedge et al., 2018).
Transparency of laws and predictability of
enforcement (v2cltrnslw)
This variable measures the extent to which the laws are
transparent and predictable. Specifically, it asks the
question: are the laws of the land clear, well publicized,
coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable
from year to year, and enforced in a predictable man-
ner? (see Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Krusell
& Miri, 2018; Coppedge et al., 2018).
Rigorousness and impartiality of public
administration (v2clfmove)
It focuses on the extent to which public officials gen-
erally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or
conversely, the extent to which public administration is
characterized by arbitrariness and biases. It asks
whether public officials are rigorous and impartial in
the performance of their duties (see Pemstein et al.,
2018; Coppedge et al., 2018).
Dependent variable
Political corruption index
This is an aggregate of four different variables in the
V-Dem, which reflect how pervasive political corrup-
tion is in the countries. The political corruption index
(v2x_corr) includes six distinct types of corruption that
covers both different areas and levels of the polity
realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative
and judicial corruption. The index includes two other
indices, namely, public sector corruption index
(v2x_pubcorr) and executive corruption index (v2x_ex-
ecorr), and two other variables, namely, legislature cor-
rupt activities (v2lgcrrpt) and judicial corruption
decision (v2jucorrdc) (see McMann, Pemstein, Teorell
& Seim 2015; Coppedge et al., 2018).
A four-step hierarchical multiple regression was per-
formed to investigate the predictive capacity of civil
society environment, transparency and predictability
of laws, and rigorousness and impartiality of public
administration factors on the level of political corrup-
tion (N = 23652) while controlling for the effect of civil
society structure. Preliminary analyses were conducted
to test whether assumptions of normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity were violated. Results indicate that
multicollinearity was unlikely to be a problem.
Missing data were handled using listwise deletion for
better comparability.
Results
The summary results of the regression are presented in
Table 1. Model 1 presents the variation on political
corruption based on the civil society structure. In
order to look at the supposed effect of civil society
Table 1. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting political corruption (N = 23652).
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
Civil Society Structure
CSO participatory environment −.039 .002 −.199** −.038 .002 −.193** −.025 .002 −.127** −.025 .002 −.125**
CSO consultation −.038 .002 −.188** −.032 .002 −.157** .011 .002 .052** .022 .002 .108**
Civil Society Environment
CSO entry and exit .037 .003 .197** .062 .002 .330** .049 .002 .262**
CSO repression −.048 .002 −.248** −.017 .002 −.085** −.006 .002 −.030*
Transparency of Laws and Predictability
of Enforcement
−.135 .002 −.700** −.054 .002 −.280**
Rigorousness and Impartiality of Public
Administration
−.111 .002 −.567**
R 0.360 0.378 0.600 0.689
R2 0.129 0.143 0.360 0.475
R2change 0.129 0.014 0.217 0.115
F for change in R2 1757.102** 189.378** 8009.485** 5178.903**
Note. Statistical significance: *p< .05. **p< .001
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environment on political corruption while controlling
for the effect of civil society structure, Model 2 is
provided (H1). Model 3 presents the effect of transpar-
ency of laws and predictability of enforcement while
controlling for the effects of the civil society structure
and civil society environment (H2). The fourth and last
model presents the effect of rigorousness and imparti-
ality of public administration on political corrup-
tion (H3).
In the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression
(Model 1), civil society structure, a measure of civil
society strength indicated by two variables from the
V-Dem, namely CSO participatory environment and
CSO consultation were entered. Civil society structure
accounts for 36% of the variance in political corruption
and the model was statistically significant (F (2, 23649) =
1757.102, p < .001). Both indicators were significant
predictors of reduction in political corruption: CSO
participatory environment (β = −0.199) and CSO con-
sultation (β = −0.188).
In the second step (Model 2), the predictor civil
society environment which has the following indicators
was entered: CSO entry and exit and CSO repression.
This model was statistically significant (F (4, 23647) =
987.236, p < .001) and explained 37.8% of the variance
in political corruption. All civil society environment
factors made a significant unique contribution to the
model. The best predictor of reduction in political
corruption in this model is CSO repression (β =
−0.248) followed by CSO participatory environment
(β = −0.193) and then CSO consultation (β = −0.157).
It is important to note that CSO entry and exit did not
lead to reduction in political corruption, and this result
was statistically significant (β = 0.197). Overall, the
entry of civil society environment resulted in only
1.4% additional variance in the dependent variable.
After entry of the variable transparency of laws and
predictability of enforcement in Model 3, the total
variance on political corruption was 60% (F (5, 23646)
= 2659.163, p < .001). While controlling for the effect of
the civil society structure and civil society environment,
transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement
accounted for the additional 21.7% variance in political
corruption. All the factors entered made a unique sig-
nificant contribution to the model, but it is important
to note that the best predictor of reduction in political
corruption in this model is transparency of laws and
predictability of enforcement (β = −0.700) followed by
CSO participatory environment (β = −0.127) and CSO
repression (β = −0.080). It is also noteworthy that with
the entry of the variable transparency of laws and pre-
dictability of enforcement in this model, CSO
consultation did not reduce political corruption (β =
0.52) unlike previously noted in Model 2.
In the final model, when the variable rigorousness
and impartiality of public administration was entered,
68.9% (F (6, 23645) = 3564.363, p < .001) of the variance
in political corruption was accounted for. The introduc-
tion of such a variable in the model, while controlling for
all the other variables, accounts for an additional 11.5%
variance in political corruption. While all the variables
entered made a unique significant contribution to the
model, the following were the best predictors in the
reduction of political corruption: rigorousness and
impartiality of public administration (β = −0.567) fol-
lowed by transparency of laws and predictability of
enforcement (β = −0.280), CSO participatory environ-
ment (β = −0.125), and CSO repression (β = −0.030). It is
important to point out as well that with the entry of
rigorousness and impartiality of public administration
in this model, CSO consultation did not lead to reduc-
tion in political corruption (β = 0.108) (unlike previously
in Model 2) similar to that reported in Model 3 when the
variable transparency of laws and predictability of enfor-
cement was entered.
Discussion and conclusion
The results above confirm the argument put forward in
this paper: while civil society and its structure is
a significant determinant of the level of political cor-
ruption, the introduction of civil society environment
(Model 2), transparency of laws and predictability of
enforcement (Model 3) and rigorousness and imparti-
ality of public administration (Model 4) in the regres-
sion model accounted for additional variance in
political corruption. However, and more importantly,
of the three predictors entered after civil society struc-
ture (in Model 1), it was transparency of laws and
predictability of enforcement that had the highest addi-
tional variance (21.7%), followed by rigorousness and
impartiality of public administration (11.5%), and civil
society environment (1.4%).
These results point not only to the import of institu-
tional arrangements, transparency of laws and predict-
ability of enforcement in this case but also to the
quality of public administration, in curbing corruption.
While the results echo the suggestions made previously
by scholars that the reduction of corruption is founded
on the presence of legal (and political) institutions, the
current study points as well to the idea that corruption
mitigation is also founded on public administration,
and especially to the agents, public officials if we may.
Moreover, while the current scholarship on the
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conditions that affect civil society’s impact on antic-
orruption point to the relevance of free media (Camaj,
2013; Themudo, 2013), politico-legal institutions
(Marinova, 2011), historical antecedents (Baiocchi,
Heller, & Silva, 2008), and political parties (Morlino,
2011), the current study highlights the supposed role of
the quality of public administration and its administra-
tors in the civil society-corruption nexus, one that has
been disregarded in the extant scholarship. While
Brown (2007) claimed that the success of any antic-
orruption initiative will also depend on the answer to
the question “Is leadership provided from the highest
levels of government?”, the current study asks whether
such leadership is also rigorous and impartial, or
whether it is characterized by arbitrariness and biases.
As such, even the debate on the relationship between
civil society and corruption, and the anticorruption
effects of civil society to be more specific, is also
founded on the discussions on the relationship between
structure and agents, one that is also at the heart of
much of the social sciences. This leads us back to, for
instance, the importance of agency (Fritzen, 2005;
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006) together with sufficiency of
existing laws (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996) and strength
of law enforcement institutions (Batalla, 2015) in cor-
ruption mitigation.
Indeed, civil society cannot battle it all alone. That
civil society organizations are an all-powerful actor by
themselves maybe an overestimation of civil society’s
potential. The contributions of civil society in antic-
orruption work are considered futile without the pre-
ceding important mechanisms discussed above. The
success therefore of any actor in anticorruption reform
and movement also hinges on the environment
national governments partly shape, including the
environment within which civil society organizations
work (specifically participatory and repressive ones as
studied here) and the broader politico-legal institu-
tional framework where governance and administra-
tion take place in general. But several notes of caution
must be made here, and this has serious implications
not only on the supposed civil society-corruption
nexus but also on the corruption-democracy linkage
in general, and on the import of the quality of public
administration as an important condition for civil
society’s anticorruption effects. It is important to
reflect on the question of whether the state has pre-
determined options for civil society (Baccaro and
Papadakis, 2009; Doyle, 2018), not only in participa-
tory governance or policy-making but also and most
especially in the anticorruption agenda of govern-
ments. For instance, it was found out in this study
that, taken all together in the final regression model,
CSO consultation did not lead to reduction of political
corruption. It is important thus to not only ask the
question of whether CSOs are routinely consulted by
policymakers; it might be prudent to ask whether
states have already had predetermined options for
civil society in its anticorruption agenda, thus making
CSO consultation irrelevant in the equation. Similarly,
more than the frequency of inclusion of CSOs in the
policy-making process by state actors (Schrama &
Zhelyazkova, 2018), the quality of engagement with
CSOs matter. As Rashid (2014) emphasized, weak
engagement of the bureaucracy with civil society and
nongovernmental organizations affects the quality of
policy inputs of a bureaucracy. Perhaps, it is only
when the quality of engagement with civil society is
improved that the positive effect, that is reduction of
political corruption, of CSO consultation transpires.
Moreover, several scholars have warned of the effect
of current trends toward democratic recession such as
the squeezing of civic space (Buyse, 2018) and on how
state elites have increasingly used the NGO legal
environment as a ruling strategy to disable dissent
(Dupuy et al., 2015; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2018) on
the vibrance of civil society and by extension, its
contribution to the enhancement of democracy and
governance. However, it is puzzling but very impor-
tant to note yet again that as found out in this study,
similar to CSO consultation but unlike CSO repres-
sion, CSO entry and exit, defined here as the extent to
which the government achieves control over the entry
and exit of CSOs into public life, did not lead to
a reduction in political corruption as the regression
models provide. Regulatory, consultative and repres-
sive environments or perhaps institutions have differ-
ing effects on political corruption.
While the current study used a large-N data that
covers about 20000 observations from about 200
countries from 1789 to 2018, it is limited in
a number of ways and these provide prospects for
further research. First, other control variables can be
used to assess the robustness of the results presented
here. For instance, it might be worth revisiting the
economistic view of corruption as put forward in the
introduction. How do economic variables factor in
this model? Second, and still founded on the over-
arching theory of institutionalism, one might be
prompted to ask how different are democratic polities
and autocracies or presidential from parliamentary
systems in this regard? Third, given the onset of
digital revolution and the ever-growing significance
of the Internet in politics, it may also be material to
look at how the state of a country’s e-government
development and e-participation conditions civil
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society’s anticorruption effects. Fourth, and most
importantly, the regression model offers only one
formula for political corruption. Could there be multi-
ple pathways to corruption, given that as emphasized
earlier in the introductory part, corruption is multi-
dimensional and multilayered? Several techniques can
be used to look at this. Qualitative comparative ana-
lysis (QCA), for instance, is informative in this regard.
Notes
1. It is a new approach to conceptualization and measure-
ment of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of
Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame (Coppedge
et al., 2018).
2. See Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik
Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning,
Jan Teorell, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Juraj
Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Natalia
Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Steven
Wilson. 2018. “V-Dem Methodology v8”. Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) Project for discussion on the
methodology of the V-Dem.
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